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AIRPORT SEARCHES AND SEIZURES-
A REASONABLE APPROACH
PATRICK W. McGINLEY AND STEPHEN P. DOWNS*
I. INTRODUCTION
A IRLANE .hijacking, or, more popularly, skyjacking' has been de-
scribed as the "escalating criminal phenomenon of our times"' and
a "continuing hazard to public travel."3 Because of the potentially cata-
strophic consequences of a skyjacking, there is a tendency on the part
of our courts to "'keep the Constitution up to date' or 'to bring it into
harmony with the times' "" by upholding the anti-hijacking procedures
currently utilized at most airports. This judicial determination to miti-
gate "the jeopardy to hundreds of human lives and millions of dollars
of property inherent in the pirating or blowing up of a large air-
plane"5 has been accomplished by an extension of the "stop-and-frisk"
rule enunciated by the Supreme Court in Terry v. Ohio.' As a result,
airport searches have been excused as limited and, on balance, insignifi-
cant intrusions of privacy.7
This article is based upon the belief that the airport screening pro-
cedures now in use are neither effective nor constitutional. There is at
the present time a "compelling necessity to protect essential air com-
merce and the lives of passengers." 8 But it is important that this pro-
tection be afforded within the constitutional framework since "the
ultimate strength of our constitutional guarantees lies in their unhesitat-
ing application in times of crisis and tranquility alike."0 The purpose
* Members of the New York Bar. Mr. McGinley received his A.B. from Iona College,
his JJ). from Seton Hall University, and his LL.M. from New York University. He is
presently a member of the firm of Gasperini, Koch & Savage, New York City. Mr. Downs
received his B.A. from Amherst College and his JJ). from Cornell University. He is
presently associated with the firm of Gasperini, Koch & Savage. The authors wish to
express their appreciation to Edward J. Kelly, Esq., and Michael Young, Esq., members of
the New York Bar, for sharing their defense experiences in airport search cases, and to
Helen Motro of New York University Law School for her research assistance.
1. The terms air hijacking, air piracy, and skyjacking are herein used interchangeably.
See note 22 infra.
2. United States v. Bell, 464 F.2d 667, 670 (2d Cir.), cert denied, 41 U.SJW. 3254 (U.S.
Nov. 6, 1972).
3. 464 F.2d at 669.
4. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 373 (1967).
5. 464 F.2d at 675.
6. 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
7. 464 F.2d at 674.
8. United States v. Epperson, 454 F.2d 769, 772 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 947
(1972).
9. 464 F.2d at 676 (Mansfield, J., concurring).
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of this article is to suggest a system of airport law enforcement that
will avoid the necessity of stretching the Terry doctrine to cover an
airport search and that will provide an effective method of combating
skyjacking.
We shall begin with the history and background of the air hijacking
problem; discuss various theories for controlling skyjackers; describe
the current airport screening procedures; examine the relevant con-
stitutional problems; and, finally, present our conclusion.
II. HISTORY AND BACKGROUND
Although recent publicity would indicate otherwise, skyjacking is not
a phenomenon of recent origin. In 1930, a band of Peruvian revolu-
tionaries seized an airplane to shower Peru with propaganda pamphlets
and thereby achieved the dubious distinction of having perpetrated the
first skyjacking.' 0 This event remained a bizarre chapter in the devel-
opment of air travel until the end of the Second World War. The war
had left Europe divided by the Communist Iron Curtain, and refugees
in Eastern Europe soon developed a new technique for fleeing Com-
munist domination. In 1947, the first successful air hijacking across
the Iron Curtain occurred." In the next year, five more air hijackings
from Eastern to Western Europe were carried out.' By 1953, fourteen
successful and two unsuccessful air hijackings had occurred, all in-
volving persons fleeing Eastern Europe. 3
Improved security in the Communist countries and greater political
stability in Europe brought a five year respite from hijackings.14 How-
ever, Fidel Castro's takeover of the government of Cuba inspired eleven
successful and five unsuccessful air hijackings from 1958 to 1960, mostly
involving Cuban citizens fleeing Castro's new Communist government.
The first skyjacking of a United States airliner occurred in May,
196116 with Cuba as the destination. Thus, a reverse flow of refugees
from non-Communist to Communist countries began. The movement
was slow at first; seven United States air hijackings occurred in the
first seven years. However, in 1968, skyjacking suddenly became a major
problem for United States aircraft. In that year alone, eighteen United
10. Aggarwala, Political Aspects of Hijacking, International Conciliation 7, 8 (Nov. 1971)
[hereinafter cited as Aggarwala]; see J. Arey, The Sky Pirates 49 (@ 1972 James A. Arey)
(used by permission of Charles Scribner's Sons) [hereinafter cited as Arey].
11. Id. at S0. For a chronology of skyjacking events, see id. at 315-54 (app. A).
12. Id. at 50-51.
13. Aggarwala 8.
14. Arey 52; Aggarwala 8.
15. Arey 52-55; Aggarwala 8-10.
16. Arey 55; Aggarwala 10.
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States airplanes were air hijacked as well as twelve foreign airplanes."
In 1969, the number of attempted air hijackings involving United States
aircraft for the year had risen to forty, of which thirty-three were
successful. Of the forty-six attempts on airplanes from other nations,
thirty-seven were successful.18
Since 1969, the number of air hijackings each year has declined. In
1970, fifty-six successful air hijackings and twenty-eight unsuccessful at-
tempts took place world wide, with eighteen successful air hijackings and
eight unsuccessful attempts involving United States planes."0 In 1971, the
Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) reported twenty-seven attempted
skyjackings on United States planes with twelve successful, and thirty-
two attempts on foreign planes with eleven successful. Between January
1 and September 1, 1972, twenty-nine attempted air hijackings were made
on United States aircraft of which eight were successful, and twenty-one
attempts on foreign planes with eleven successes.20
Not surprisingly, legislative activity has followed closely behind each
new increase in skyjacking activity. In 1961, Congress passed a stat-
ute2' which closed a curious loophole in the law by making skyjacking
per se a crime. Theretofore, skyjacking had been a crime only to the
extent that some other crime was committed in the act of commandeer-
ing the aircraft.2




20. The statistics for 1971-1972 were obtained from reports compiled by the Federal
Aviation Administration (FAA) upon our verbal inquiry. For detailed listing of all sky-
jackings up to October 29, 1972, see FAA, Office of Air Transportation Security, Domestic
and Foreign Aircraft Hijackings (1972).
21. 49 U.S.C. § 1472(i)-(m) (1970), as amended 49 U.S.C.A. § 1472(i)-(m) (1972 Supp.).
22. Piracy is defined in the 1958 Geneva Convention on the High Seas as "[a]ny illegal
acts of violence... committed for private ends by the crew or passengers of a private ship
or a private aircraft, and directed: (a) On the high seas, against another ship or aircraft, or
against persons or property on board such ship or aircraft; (b) Against a ship, aircraft,
persons or property in a place outside the jurisdiction of any State... ." Convention on the
High Seas, Apr. 29, 1958, [19621 2 U.S.T. 2312 2317, T.I.A.S. No. 5200, 450 U.N.T.S. 82.
Most aerial hijackings simply do not fit this definition as they often take place within the
jurisdiction of a particular State and are not directed against another ship or aircraft. Also,
in some cases, it is questionable whether the act was for private ends. Aggarvwala 14. The
term "hijack" is defined as stealing something in transit. Webster's Third International
Dictionary 1069 (3d ed. 1964). Thus, it also does not technically apply to the aircraft
situation, particularly where the aircraft is ultimately returned. In such a case, under
traditional criminal law, the only remaining crimes would be "assault" and "theft of
service" (although if the hijacker had purchased a ticket to a further point even this latter
crime is questionable).
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Committed on Board Aircraft" was drawn up under the auspices of the
International Civil Aviation Organization.24 This convention attempted
to clear up questions of jurisdiction so that existing national penal
laws could be utilized against a skyjacker upon capture. However, it
did little to answer problems such as the need to create the specific
crime of skyjacking or to accomplish the extradition of a captured
skyjacker. The convention became effective in 1968.2"
When skyjacking began to escalate sharply after 1968, two more in-
ternational conventions to control skyjacking were drafted. The first,
The Hague Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Air-
craft 1970,26 attempted to establish an international definition of the
offense of skyjacking and provided for the mandatory punishment or
extradition of all skyjackers taken into custody in a signatory state."
The convention went into effect in 1971 and was ratified by the United
States Senate on September 8, 1971.8
The second convention, the Montreal Convention for the Suppression
of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Civil Aviation,29 prepared in
1971, has expanded the Hague Convention to include sabotage, extor-
tionary threats or other types of force against an aircraft."' It was ratified
by the United States Senate on October 3, 1972.31
Recent federal legislative activity reflects the growing concern and
confusion over what must be done to combat air hijackings. On Septem-
ber 21, 1972, the United States House of Representatives passed a
bill " requested by the administration; Title I of the bill was called
the Anti-Hijacking Act of 1972 and Title II was known as the Air
Transportation Security Act of 1972.83 The bill, in part, was comple-
mentary to the Hague Convention which provided that all signatory
states would enact severe penalties for skyjacking. 4 The bill also pro-
23. Convention on Offenses and Certain Other Acts Committed on Board Aircraft,
Sept. 14, 1963, [1969] 3 U.S.T. 2941, T.I.A.S. No. 6768.
24. FitzGerald, Toward Legal Suppression of Acts Against Civil Aviation, International
Conciliation 42, 45-46 (Nov. 1971) [hereinafter cited as FitzGerald].
25. Id. at 46.
26. T.I.A.S. No. 7192 (1970).
27. FitzGerald 51-66.
28. 117 Cong. Rec. 13,894-95 (daily ed. Sept. 8, 1971).
29. 10 Int'l Legal Materials 1151 (1971).
30. FitzGerald 66-76.
31. 118 Cong. Rec. 16,651-53 (daily ed. Oct. 3, 1972).
32. S. 2280, 92d Cong., 2d Sess., 118 Cong. Rec. 15,633-35 (daily ed. Sept. 21, 1972).
33. Id.
34. Id. at 15,631. Although the bill provided that skyjacking may be punished by death,
questions were raised as to whether such a penalty would be constitutional. Id. (remarks
of Senator Chiles).
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posed that United States law be brought into harmony with the Mon-
treal Convention by including as offenses, sabotage against aircraft and
threats to its passengers. 5
Under this anti-hijacking bill, the President would be empowered,
with respect to countries acting in a manner inconsistent with the Hague
Convention or acting as a base or sanctuary for skyjackers, to (1)
suspend the right of any airline, domestic or foreign, to operate to such
country, or (2) suspend the right of other foreign countries to operate
air service to the United States unless they were to terminate their air
service with the offending nation."8
The proposed Air Transportation Security Act would have made man-
datory on all airlines, domestic and foreign, the use of the federal
anti-hijacking procedures. It would also have empowered the Adminis-
tration of the Federal Aviation Administration to search all embarking
passengers or baggage, and to refuse transportation to anyone not con-
senting to such a searchY
The House bill, however, was significantly modified in the Senate
which disagreed with the administration's theory that the financial bur-
den of the anti-hijacking procedures and airport security should be
borne, for the most part, by the airlines.u The Senate version provided
for a large federal expenditure to equip a corps of federal marshals
to enforce the various provisions of the Act. After several attempts, a
joint House-Senate conference was unable to resolve their differences
and the fate of the proposed legislation was postponed until 1973P9
Ill. THEorES FOR CONTROLLING SKYJACKING
The rush for new legislation has been accompanied by a search for
theories to control skyjacking. It has been generally believed that if
the skyjacker's motivations could be identified, it would be possible to
find a means of preventing or at least controlling the threat0 The
following is a brief description of the more common patterns and mo-
tivations of skyjackers, together with some theories for control.
A. Politics and the Armed Guard Theory of Control
Since 1967, politically motivated air hijackings have accounted for
almost two-thirds of such crimes. 1 The majority of such skyjackings
35. Id. at 15,633.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 15,634.
38. Id. at 15,622 (remarks of Senator Cannon).
39. N.Y. Times, Oct. 14, 1972, at 32, coL 1.




involved persons fleeing a particular political system, or concerned vari-
ous militant or extremist groups such as the Black Panthers, Asian and
Latin American Communists, African liberationists and revolutionaries
from the Middle East.
Another motivation for skyjacking is political blackmail. The most
spectacular political plot to blackmail was the attempt, by the Popular
Front for the Liberation of Palestine in September, 1970, to simul-
taneously seize five airlines in order to bargain for the release of Arab
prisoners." One attempt on an El Al airliner failed, but planes from
TWA, Swissair and BOAC were hijacked to Jordan, and a Pan Ameri-
can aircraft was hijacked to Cairo."' After nearly three weeks of tense
negotiations, the passengers were released in exchange for seven Arab
prisoners. The aircraft, however, were blown up. Despite the adverse
publicity arising from this incident, the Middle East has increasingly
become a target for political hijackers.44
Other air hijackings have had more direct political results. In 1956,
an aircraft carrying certain Algerian rebels to Tunisia was diverted by
its own crew to a French army base, as the result of a conspiracy with
the French Government. 0 Similarly, in 1967, an aircraft carrying the
Congolese Prime Minister, Moise Tshombe, was skyjacked to Algeria
and the Prime Minister taken prisoner by the Algerian Government.40
More recently, in 1971, two Libyan jets forced a BOAC commercial
airliner to land in Benghazi so that two Sudanese army officers flying
to join a revolution in Khartoum could be arrested.47
Skyjackings carried out for direct political effect, such as the BOAC
or Tshombe incidents, are difficult to prevent. Certain officials, how-
ever, believe that skyjackings, particularly those that are politically
motivated, can be deterred by a program of armed guards on all flights.
The United States Government, at one point, established a corps of
armed marshals to guard those flights considered most susceptible to
skyjackings, but the program was terminated after it proved ineffec-
tive.48 Some foreign airlines, however, continue to employ armed
guards.49
42. Id. at 12.
43. Id.




48. 118 Cong. Rec. 15,622 (daily ed. Sept. 21, 1972) (remarks of Senator Cannon).
49. Fenello, Technical Prevention of Air Piracy, International Conciliation 28, 34, 37
(Nov. 1971) [hereinafter cited as Fenello].
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B. Extortion and the No-Pay Theory of Control
Extortion includes the several types of violence employed against air-
planes for the purpose of financial gain. Certain of these extortion
plots, while technically within the anti-hijacking laws previously men-
tioned, do not correspond to the popular conception of ait hijacking.
These, for example, would include the destruction of an airplane on
which the perpetrator has recently placed an unsuspecting "loved one"
in order to obtain life insurance proceeds. After insurance companies
began refusing to pay for deaths resulting from deliberate explosions,
a variation of this plot was conceived. The perpetrator would conceal
or pretend to conceal a bomb on an airplane and then offer to reveal
the location of the bomb in exchange for a large sum of money.
Another type of air hijacking, in this general category, emerged spec-
tacularly in November, 1971, when one "D. B. Cooper" hijacked a
Northwest jetliner.60 After landing in order to exchange the passengers for
a parachute and $200,000 in cash, Cooper forced the pilot to take off
again. Before the flight ended, Cooper dropped out through the rear door
of the aircraft and parachuted into his own corner of American folk
legend.51 However, most skyjackers forego these machinations and simply
demand millions of dollars to release the skyjacked plane and its pas-
sengers.
Political blackmail and extortion-motivated skyjackings could arguably
be deterred if the federal government were to secure legislation making it
illegal to pay any ransom for a skyjacked plane. However, the general
response to this proposal is that the immediate threat to the well-being
of passengers must outweigh any long term possibility of deterrence
based on a no-pay policy 2
C. Escape and the No-Sanctuary Theory of Control
As mentioned above, the majority of skyjackings have probably been
perpetrated by persons seeking to escape a particular political system 3
In addition, a number of other persons have attempted to skyjack their
way beyond the reach of the law simply to escape from financial or other
personal problems 4
It should be noted, however, that regardless of whether a skyjacker's
50. N.Y. Times, Nov. 25, 1971, at 1, col. 1; id., Nov. 19, 1972, § 1, at 3, cOL 1.
51. Such rear doors were subsequently sealed to prevent a repetition of this feat.
52. Nevertheless, some countries, particularly Israel and its national airline, El Al, do
not subscribe to this response.
53. See Arey 182.
54. Id. at 146.
1972]
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motivation is politics or extortion, escape is always his object. The antici-
pation of escape is the very foundation on which skyjacking rests. If there
were no haven to which a skyjacker could flee, skyjackings (except, of
course, for suicide bombings or extortion threats where the perpetrator is
not on board) would in all probability cease to be a significant threat.
Because of this underlying objective of escape, it is generally agreed that
the best method of controlling skyjacking is to convince a potential sky-
jacker, before he boards a plane, that there will be no sanctuary for him
anywhere in the world."
Unfortunately, cooperation between nations on skyjacking has not been
easily achieved. Those countries which had not signed either the Tokyo,
Hague or Montreal conventions included, as of November 16,1971, Cuba,
Algeria, Egypt, Syria, Nepal, Tunisia, Yemen, Lebanon, Sudan,
Morocco, Bolivia, Libya, Peru, Republic of Viet-Nam, Uganda and
Uruguay.56 Nevertheless, at the present time, the nations of the world
seem closer than ever to the acceptance of international controls on sky-
jacking.5" After World War II, when Communist countries were the
principal victims of skyjacking, the West tended to regard skyjackers as
heroes escaping Communist domination. It is only since domestic airlines
have been seriously affected by the skyjacking problem that the United
States Government has sought international agreement to control this
problem.
Before such international agreement is achieved, it is generally agreed
that certain steps should be taken to discourage skyjackers. For instance,
Cuba has been the destination of numerous skyjackers with criminal
backgrounds and psychiatric problems. On several occasions, the Cuban
authorities have meted out prison sentences or other forms of punish-
ment.58 Publicizing the penalties inflicted by foreign countries upon
hijackers could help to dissuade potential skyjackers from the hope of
locating a foreign sanctuary. In this regard, it appears that Cuba
intends to put three American skyjackers on public trial in order to
discourage hijackers from landing there."0
55. Id. at 265, 274-77.
56. FitzGerald 79.
57. As of November 16, 1971, 58 countries had signed the Tokyo Convention. Id. at 82.
See also N.Y. Times, Nov. 19, 1972, § 4, at 10, col. 1, and § 4, at 11, col, 1.
58. "Of approximately 60 American skyjackers in Cuba 20 are believed to be In jail,
while most of the others are under house arrest, confined in mental hospitals or worlng
in the sugar cane fields." N.Y. Sunday News, Nov. 19, 1972 at 77, col. 1.
59. N.Y. Times, Nov. 21, 1972, at 1, col. 6; id., Nov. 19, 1972, § 4, at 11, col. 1.
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D. Mental Derangement and the Personality Theory of Control
"Mental derangement" is sometimes given as the reason for a particular
skyjacking. 0 Convenient though this explanation may be, it glosses over
a very significant body of psychiatric theory beginning to emerge from
recent studies of skyjackers. For example, Dr. David Hubbard, a Dallas
psychiatrist, argues that the psychiatric make-up of hijackers is very
similar, whatever their motivation may be.6' Dr. Hubbard, after studying
some 48 air hijackers, found all to be "mentally unstable, suicidal and
belligerent losers" who share fantasies of dying a heroic death, fear
heights, and are attracted to domineering women. -
Dr. John T. Dailey, Chief Psychologist of the FAA, recently made the
following comment about American air hijackers:
We have found in our studies that they are amateurs. They weren't organized, they
weren't very resourceful, they weren't very determined. They were a real bunch of
losers. Many of our hijacking attempts have been very inept, undertaken by people
who break down in the middle and quit trying, who can be talked out of what they
may have started, or are so incompetent that the crew is able to disarm them without
endangering the passengers.63
From such studies, it was concluded that an effective anti-skyjacking
system could be designed based upon similar patterns and weaknesses in
the personality of the average skyjacker.11
IV. TnE FEDERAL ANTI-HIJACKING PROCEDURES
In February, 1969, the FAA began an investigation of new methods of
preventing air hijackings.65 As a result of the efforts of the FAA, an anti-
skyjacking system was developed that incorporated many of the theories
previously discussed.
The system as it presently exists includes a program to publicize the
latest information on criminal sentences given skyjackers in foreign
countries, particularly Cuba. 6 It also attempts to supply information or
assistance to foreign countries for the prosecution or extradition of
American-based skyjackers. 7 However, the most important aspects in the
60. Arey 127-45.
61. Perilous War on the Skyjacker, Life, Aug. 11, 1972, at 26, 29.
62. Id.
63. Interview with Dr. John T. Dailey, Chief Psychologist of the FAA, in Arey 99.
64. Id. at 98-103; see United States v. Lopez, 328 F. Supp. 1077, 1032-85, 1086-92
(E.D.N.Y. 1971).
65. Arey 234.
66. Such publicity may have been a significant factor in causing the number of Sky-
jackings from the United States to Cuba to decrease to 31 in 1969, to 14 in 1970, to 10 in




program are the pre-boarding passenger surveillance system, using a
"profile" of the average potential hijacker and an electronic search with
a device capable of detecting metal-the magnetometer. Before describing
how this passenger surveillance system operates, it is necessary to de-
scribe briefly the profile and magnetometer.
A. The Profile
The profile was begun in October, 1968, by a task force of agencies
including the FAA, the Department of Justice and the Department of
Commerce. This task force completed a detailed study of the character-
istics of all then known air hijackers and identified certain attributes
supposedly distinguishing potential air hijackers from the general public.08
With some modification, these characteristics were eventually compiled
into a "profile" of a potential skyjacker, consisting of approximately
twenty-five characteristics. Of these, only a small number are utilized at
any one time to screen embarking passengers. 9
Informed discussion about the profile is difficult because the character-
istics are secret. However, these characteristics are ostensibly based on
the behavioral characteristics of embarking passengers rather than on
inherited or social characteristics. 0
On occasion, officials have discussed the basic theory of the profile. One
such official is the FAA's Dr. John T. Dailey:
There isn't any common denominator except in [the hijackers'] behavior. Some will
be tall, some short, some will have long hair, some not, some a long nose, et cetera,
et cetera. There is no way to tell a hijacker by looking at him. But there are ways to
differentiate between the behavior of a potential hijacker and that of the usual air
traveler. This is what we depend on: that is what we call our profile of the be-
havioral characteristics of a hijacker. We stress it is behavior-things they do or
don't do, or their style of doing it or not doing it.71
Dr. Dailey also noted:
The way we have it set up now, it [the behavioral pattern] is highly simplified. We
have a small number of criteria and the way it works now he must meet every one
of them. If we were to find it necessary to put in additional criteria, to emphasize
the difference between hijackers and other passengers, we might then require the
passenger to meet some but not all of the criteria. With the smaller number we now
use, the passenger must meet them all to be cleared.72
68. United States v. Lopez, 328 F. Supp. 1077, 1082 (E.D.N.Y. 1971).
69. United States v. Slocum, 464 F.2d 1180, 1182 (3d Cir. 1972).
70. See 328 F. Supp. at 1086-87.
71. Interview with Dr. John T. Dailey, Chief Psychologist of the FAA, in Arey 241.
72. Id. at 240.
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B. The Magnetometer
As initially devised, a suspect selected by the profile (a "selectee") was
subjected to an examination by a magnetometer to determine whether he
was carrying a significant amount of metal. A magnetometer is a device
which is able to detect the presence of ferrous metal by sensing the
deflections which the metal causes in the earth's magnetic field.I It is a
passive device which emits no rays or signals but merely reacts to the
effect of nearby metal on the earth's magnetic field. 4
An airport magnetometer generally consists of two upright metal rods.
The embarking passenger walks between the rods and, if he is carrying
more than a particular threshold amount of metal, a light or buzzer is
activated. The machine's threshold can be calibrated-usually to the
amount of metal found in a small hand gun. Advanced versions of the
magnetometer can be calibrated to indicate the mass or the amount of
the metal and they can even be designed to show where on a passenger the
metal is located. Some airports utilize portable hand magnetometers which
can be moved over a person's body or over baggage to detect the location
of any ferrous metal.7 5
It should be stressed that a magnetometer can only detect ferrous
metal. It cannot detect weapons without ferrous metal and, more im-
portanfly, it cannot distinguish ferrous metal objects which are not
weapons from those which are. The magnetometer is, therefore, far more
useful in theory than in practice. Because it will react to coins, keys,
cigarette lighters, steel shoe plates, and other innocuous objects, it is
activated by approximately 50 percent of all those who pass through its
poles . 7
C. Airport Procedure77
When a passenger arrives at the check-in counter, the airline personnel
apply the behavioral profile. Statistics indicate that 0.28 percent of pas-
sengers come within the profile,78 and those who do not are simply cleared
for boarding at the check-in counter. Those passengers whose behavior
matches the profile are designated as "selectees." The selectee's ticket is
73. See id. at 243-44.
74. See id.; 328 F. Supp. at 1085.
75. Wahl, How Science Will Foil the Skyjacker, Popular Science, Nov. 1970, at 58. See
generally sources cited in 328 F. Supp. at 1085.
76. 328 F. Supp. at 1086.
77. For descriptions of the airplane boarding procedures, see United States v. Bell, 464
F.2d 667, 668-69 (2d Cir. 1972); United States v. Edmunds, Crim. No. 71-251 (E.D.N.Y.,
filed Jan. 24, 1972).
78. 328 F. Supp. at 1084.
1972]
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usually marked with a distinguishing sign or code signal by which the
airline officials monitoring embarking passengers are alerted that a
selectee will be boarding shortly. An airline investigator is also assigned
to watch the selectee. To protect the system against disclosure when one
passenger is designated a selectee, passengers accompanying him, or even
passengers in proximity, may also be designated selectees.
There is apparently no mandatory procedure to be followed when the
selectee presents himself for boarding. An airline official generally con-
fronts the selectee and asks for identification. The selectee may also be
examined by the magnetometer, although this procedure may not be em-
ployed if the passenger produces adequate identification. In other cases,
the airline may subject all embarking passengers to the magnetometer
search without regard to whether they may be selectees. However,
selectees generally will not be frisked for weapons without first having
activated the magnetometer.
There is also apparently no uniform procedure for airline officials to
summon a United States marshal. Generally, if the selectee does not acti-
vate the magnetometer, or if he produces adequate identification, he is
allowed to board the plane. Otherwise, the airline personnel may summon
a United States marshal who will proceed with the investigation. The
marshal's investigation may include another request for identification, a
further direction to walk through the magnetometer and to identify the
source of the metal if the magnetometer is activated. If the marshal is still
not satisfied with the selectee's performance, he may ultimately conduct
a frisk or pat-down of the selectee's outer clothing."
The basic objective of the pre-flight passenger surveillance system and,
indeed, of the entire FAA anti-hijacking program is deterrence.8 0 This is
based on the assumption that the average American skyjacker has a
"loser" or "failure" personality, and will be easily discouraged from
commandeering an aircraft if faced with a series of obstacles and prob-
lems such as a mysterious psychological profile, a scientific electronic
search, an interrogation, and a physical search.
As stated by Frank Cardman, Director of Security of Pan American
World Airways:
The general public thinks of the behavioral profile as a slick device of behavioral
measurement, much more in the area of cosmetics and psychological behavior and
that type of thing. It's anything but ... yet as long as they think that, well and good.
The mere fact that the public knows you're operating a behavioral profile and mag-
79. In a sampling of 500,000 passengers screened by the system, about 0.289 satisfied the
profile; half of this number activated the magnetometer, and of these about !l3 or 0.05%
of all embarking passengers were singled out for frisking. Of the number frisked, about
6% were arrested. Id.
80. See Arey 234-42.
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netometer provides a psychological deterrent. There is no question about it-operative
or inoperative, it has been a deterrent.8'
With respect to whether the profile is actually able to detect potential
criminals, Mr. Cardman has said:
The profile is not a psychological measurement. It simply qualifies the person by age
and characteristics of ticket purchase-not as somebody who is a potential hijacker,
but as somebody who should be looked at further. This is what it does.8 2
Indeed, from these observations, it would appear that the profile is not
based on what might generally be considered the suspicious behavior of
passengers, such as heavy breathing, perspiration, confusion, and so on.
Rather, the profile is predicated upon the manner in which a passenger
presents himself for boarding.
The statistics cited earlier on the number of successful and attempted
skyjackings 3 indicate that immediately after the anti-hijacking proce-
dures were implemented there was a significant drop in the number of
attempted skyjackings. However, after this initial decline, the number of
attempts and the number of successful skyjackings of United States
planes has remained relatively constant. This data suggests that the
present anti-hijacking procedures have been relatively successful in their
primary objective of discouraging many of the failures and misfits from
attempting to commandeer an airplane, but that there remains a fairly
consistent number of potential hijackers who either do not show similar
81. Interview with Frank Cardman, Director of Security, Pan American World Airways,
quoted in id. at 242. Dr. Dailey, speaking of the profile and the anti-hijacking procedures
in general, has stated: "'One common denominator among [skyjackers] is that they are
losers, unsuccessful people. They've never done anything very well. They're failure-prone.
They tend to give up when they run up against an obstacle. And they're not very clever.
This is the reason we thought, at first, that we would be able to scare them off--some of
them, at least-by making them believe that hijacking is a very difficult thing to do. The
thing that we faced when we started to fight the epidemic was this public image of hijack-
ing being the simplest thing in the world to do, that anybody could do it without risk of
failure."' Id. at 99. "'This is like anti-submarine or anti-aircraft warfare. What you try
to do is put as many obstacles as possible there to raise the risk of failure as high as you
can. Then, in addition-and I want to stress this-through the use of public information
to make this as vivid as possible to the right people so they would perceive these obstacles
as maximally discouraging." Id. at 270. Dr. Dailey also said: "Our thought here is that if
we are really successful in this we will never catch anybody, because theyll be afraid to try
and therefore won't try; but that if they do try, to make every effort to catch as many as
possible ... knowing that we can't catch all of them. Some are bound to slip through the
screen. No matter what, even if your policy were one hundred percent search, after a couple
of weeks people would let down and be careless and there would still be some of them that
would get through." Id.
82. Id. at 241.
83. See notes 17-20 supra and accompanying text.
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patterns of behavior or do not come within the profile. Accordingly, the
latter are not being deterred or detected by the present system.
V. AIRPORT SEARCH AND SEiz=UE DEcIsIoNS
Arrests arising from the anti-hijacking procedures are becoming in-
creasingly frequent and the great majority are unrelated to attempts at
skyjacking. In the last twenty-two months, almost 6,000 passengers have
been arrested as a result of airport searches. Between January and
November, 1972, more than 3,000 persons were arrested, including 1,350
persons in the three-month period between July and October, 1972. Of
those arrests, fewer than 20 percent were for carrying concealed
weapons or for other crimes possibly related to skyjacking. Approxi-
mately one-third of the arrests related to possession of drugs, one-third
involved charges of illegal entry, and the remainder ranged from parole
violation to forgery.84 Many of the defendants involved in these arrests
have claimed that the airport security measures currently in use have
violated their rights under the Constitution, particularly the fourth
amendment.
A. The Fourth Amendment
The fourth amendment to the United States Constitution provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants
shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and partic-
ularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.85
Generally, searches are per se unreasonable, without prior judicial
authorization, subject only to a few well-delineated exceptions. 80 As a
practical matter, no warrant can be obtained for an airport search. Even
if facts composing probable cause were discovered at the airline boarding
gate, time limitations would effectively preclude the obtaining of a search
warrant.
Typically, airport searches cannot be justified on the basis of implied
consent, 8 as "incident to an arrest,"8 9 as involving "hot pursuit,""0 or
because of the danger of imminent destruction of evidence."1 Moreover,
84. N.Y. Times, Nov. 26, 1972, § 1, at 1, col. 1.
85. U.S. Const. amend. IV.
86. See The Supreme Court, 1967 Term, 82 Harv. L. Rev. 63, 193 (1968).
87. United States v. Lopez, 328 F. Supp. 1077, 1092 (E.D.N.Y. 1971).
88. Id. at 1092-93.
89. See Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969).
90. See Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (1967).
91. See Scbmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966).
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no apparent offense is committed in the presence of the officer," - nor is
any contraband in plain and open viewY3
Since these foregoing traditional exceptions to the warrant rule are not
applicable to the airport search, the only justifiable exception is the pro-
tective "frisk" for weapons authorized by Terry v. Ohio.94 Accordingly,
each case that has focused on the constitutional problems surrounding
airport searches has utilized Terry as its touchstone.
B. The Terry Doctrine
In Terry v. Ohioi an experienced police officer observed Terry and two
co-defendants walking repeatedly back and forth in front of a store,
looking into the window and conferring with one another. The officer
became suspicious, believing the men were "'casing a job, a stick-up,' ,,95
and considered it his duty as a law officer to investigate further. The
officer approached the defendants, identified himself, and asked their
names. When the men mumbled something, the officer spun Terry around,
patted him down the outside of his clothing and felt a bulge in his coat
pocket which proved to be a gun. Terry was arrested and convicted of
carrying a concealed weaponY6
The Supreme Court affirmed the conviction over Terry's objection that
the weapon was seized by means of an unreasonable search. The Court
rejected the theory that a "stop-and-frisk" falls outside the category of
searches subject to fourth amendment limitations because it involves a
lesser restraint than a traditional searchY2'
Although the reasonableness of a search was traditionally anchored to
the fourth amendment requirement of probable cause, the Court in Terry
introduced the concept of reasonable suspicion, and distinguished it from
probable cause as an admittedly lesser standard justifying a lesser govern-
mental intrusion into an individual's constitutionally protected area. The
Supreme Court explicitly rejected the contention that a protective
weapons search could only be performed as incident to an arrest on
"probable cause,"98s but, at the same time, it refused to sanction frisks on
mere "inarticulate hunches."99 The Court concluded that governmental
interest in the prevention of crime and the interest of the individual law
enforcement officer in self-protection from attack by individuals, whom
92. See Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40 (1968).
93. See Harris v. United States, 390 U.S. 234 (1968).
94. 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
95. Id. at 6.
96. State v. Terry, 5 Ohio App. 2d 122, 214 N.E.2d 114 (1966).
97. 392 US. at 31.
98. Id. at 26-27.
99. Id. at 22.
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he reasonably suspects to be armed and whose conduct he is legitimately
investigating, are sufficient to justify a limited search for weapons."'
To be legitimately investigating, the police officer must be possessed of
facts, rather than inarticulate hunches. These concepts are highlighted by
contrasting Terry and a case decided by the Supreme Court on the same
day, Sibron v. New York. 1°1 In Sibron, a police officer had observed the
defendant talking with a number of known narcotics addicts over a period
of eight hours. Relying solely on these observations, the police officer
confronted Sibron and said: "'You know what I am after.' 11o2 Sibron
mumbled a reply, and as he began to reach into his pocket, the officer
intercepted his hand, reached into the same pocket and discovered enve-
lopes containing heroin.' 0° Sibron was subsequently convicted of unau-
thorized possession of narcotics.104
The Supreme Court reversed Sibron's conviction, finding that the
police officer did not have probable cause to arrest, and that the frisk was
unreasonable because the officer did not have sufficient facts to warrant a
belief that Sibron was armed and dangerous.1°5
As a means of limiting the scope of stop-and-frisk and thereby avoiding
the unreasonableness found in Sibron, the Terry Court articulated three
factors to be balanced in determining reasonable suspicion:
In order to assess the reasonableness of [the officer's] conduct as a general proposi-
tion, it is necessary "first to focus upon the governmental interest which allegedly
justifies official intrusion upon the constitutionally protected interests of the private
citizen," for there is "no ready test for determining reasonableness other than by
balancing the need to search [or seize] against the invasion which the search [or
seizure] entails." Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 534-535, 536-5,37 (1967).
And in justifying the particular intrusion the police officer must be able to point to
specific and articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences from
those facts, reasonably warrant that intrusion. The scheme of the Fourth Amendment
becomes meaningful only when it is assured that at some point the conduct of those
charged with enforcing the laws can be subjected to the more detached, neutral
scrutiny of a judge who must evaluate the reasonableness of a particular search or
seizure in light of the particular circumstances.100
Accordingly, in each airport search, one must examine (1) the govern-
mental interest justifying the need to search, (2) the extent of invasion
the search entails, and (3) the specific, articulable facts reasonably war-
100. Id. at 30-31.
101. 392 U.S. 40 (1968)
102. Id. at 4S
103. Id.
104. People v. Sibron, 18 N.Y.2d 603, 219 N.E.2d 196, 272 N.Y.S.2d 374 (1966) (moin.).
105. 392 U.S. at 62-64.
106. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20-21 (1968) (footnotes omitted),
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ranting the intrusion. With these Terry criteria as background, we turn
now to a discussion of the cases that have considered the validity of
airport searches within the framework of the anti-hijacking screening
system.
United States v. Lopez107 was the first case to consider the constitu-
tionality of airport screening procedures. A thorough decision, highly
descriptive of the screening procedures, Lopez has frequently been cited
in subsequent cases in this area. 08
Defendant Lopez was designated a "selectee" at the time of the check-
in and was about to board a flight when he activated a magnetometer.
He was then requested to produce identification by the monitoring fed-
eral marshal. Upon failing to produce satisfactory identification, Lopez'
outer clothing was frisked and an envelope measuring approximately
four inches by six inches by three-fourths of an inch was taken from him.
He was thereupon arrested and charged with concealing and facilitating
the transportation of heroin. 09
A motion to suppress the evidence was granted and the case dismissed
because the airline had added, to the approved FAA profile, an ethnic
characteristic and other criteria calling for an individual decision based
on the personal judgment of an airline employee."' The court found
that these changes destroyed the essential neutrality and objectivity of
the approved profile. 1 Nevertheless, it upheld the current anti-hijacking
system, properly supervised, as constitutional and sufficiently accurate
in detecting illegal conduct to warrant the type of temporary investigative
detention and "frisk" deemed valid in Terry v. Ohio.1"2
However, in considering the utilization of the magnetometer, Judge
Weinstein noted in Lopez:
Even the use of the magnetometer might be an objectionable intrusion were it not
accompanied by an antecedent warning from the profile indicating a need to focus
particular attention on the subject. We do not now decide whether, in the absence of
some prior indication of danger, the government may validly require any citizen to
pass through an electronic device which probes beneath his clothing and effects to
reveal what he carries with him.13
107. 328 F. Supp. 1077 (E.D.N.Y. 1971).
108. E.g., United States v. Bell, 464 F.2d 667, 669 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 41 US.L.W.
3254 (U.S. Nov. 6, 1972); United States v. Epperson, 454 F.2d 769, 771 (4th Cir.), cert.
denied, 406 U.S. 947 (1972); United States v. Edmunds, Crim. No. 71-251 at 13 (EMD.N.Y.,
filed Jan. 24, 1972) ; People v. Erdman, 69 Aisc. 2d 103, 106-07, 108, 329 N.YS.2d 654, 658,
659 (Sup. Ct. 1972).
110. Id. at 1101.
111. Id.
112. 392 U.S. 1 (1967).
113. 328 F. Supp. at 1100.
1972]
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
Subsequent to Lopez, an airport situation arose which presented
another court with the precise issue that had been avoided in Lopez-
namely, whether the use of the magnetometer is by itself a search under
the fourth amendment. In United States v. Epperson,"4 a defendant was
charged with attempting to board an aircraft engaged in interstate com-
merce while carrying a concealed weapon. Epperson gave his flight ticket
to an airline employee at the gate and proceeded toward the plane, acti-
vating the magnetometer. Because of the activation, defendant was
searched by a United States marshal and a loaded pistol was found on
his person.': 5 Since there had been no prior profile designation of defen-
dant as a "selectee," the sole basis for stopping and frisking Epperson
was his activation of the magnetometer. The court concluded that the
use of a magnetometer in these circumstances did constitute a "search,"
but that the Constitution forbade only those searches that were un-
reasonable:
To require a search warrant as a prerequisite to the use of a magnetometer would
exalt form over substance, for it is beyond belief that any judicial officer would refuse
such a warrant with or without a supporting affidavit. The danger is so well known,
the governmental interest so overwhelming, and the invasion of privacy so minimal,
that the warrant requirement is excused by exigent national circumstances....
We think the search for the sole purpose of discovering weapons and preventing
air piracy, and not for the purpose of discovering weapons and precriminal events,
fully justified the minimal invasion of personal privacy by magnetometer.110
On the issue of the reasonableness of the subsequent frisk, the court
held that once the magnetometer indicated a large amount of metal,
the personal frisk was justified because of the marshal's reasonable fear
that the safety of the other passengers was in danger." 7 The court, rely-
ing on Terry, affirmed defendant's conviction, stating that "since the
use of the magnetometer was justified at its inception, and since the sub-
sequent physical frisk was justified by the information developed by the
magnetometer, and since the search was limited in scope to the circum-
stances which justified the interference in the first place, we hold the
search and seizure not unreasonable under the 4th Amendment." 118
The rationale of the Epperson court was followed in United States v.
Slocum,"' wherein the defendant met the profile and also activated the
114. 454 F.2d 769 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 947 (1972).
115. 454 F.2d at 770. It should be noted that all passengers were required to pass by the
magnetometer to board the airplane. Id.
116. Id. at 771.
117. Id. at 772.
118. Id.
119. 464 F.2d 1180 (3d Cir. 1972).
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magnetometer when he attempted to board an aircraft. The marshal
stopped Slocum and requested identification. When the defendant was
unable to produce any identification, he was frisked by the marshal who
found nothing which could have activated the magnetometer. The mar-
shal then turned his attention to defendant's hand luggage and found a
rolled-up sock containing a "definite foreign substance," which, upon
inspection, proved to be cocaine. 20
In upholding Slocum's conviction for possession of narcotic drugs, the
court, relying on Epperson, held that a magnetometer search per se was
justified "within the context of a potential hijacking."' 2 ' The court, not-
ing that the use of the profile should not be "considered as an attempt
to establish probable cause and, therefore.., subject to scrutiny accord-
ing to Fourth Amendment standards,"'2 2 found the search to be reason-
able in view of defendant's lack of identification and failure to explain
what caused the activation of the magnetometer.123
In United States v. Bell,' defendant Bell was convicted of a failure
to pay a tax on narcotics."r At the airport, Bell matched the behavioral
"profile" and also activated the magnetometer. A federal marshal then
approached him and, after ascertaining Bell's lack of identification and
his criminal background,20 searched him and found a quantity of
heroin .1 7 Defendafit's motion to suppress the evidence was denied'2'
and his conviction subsequently affirmed.Y9
120. Id. at 1181.
121. Id. at 1182.
122. Id. at 1183.
123. Id.
124. 464 F.2d 667 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 41 US.L.W. 3254 (U.S. Nov. 6, 1972); accord,
United States v. Edmunds, Crim. No. 71-251 (E.D.N.Y., filed Jan. 24, 1972), in which the
behavior pattern profile was applied to the defendants at the time they bought their tickets.
Subsequently, "[wihile the evidence about precisely what happened is not altogether satis-
factory," (id. at 8) the United States marshal applied the magnetometer and searched both
defendants. The search resulted in the discovery of heroin in defendants' topcoats. Interest-
ingly, there was no satisfactory evidence that either defendant had anything on their
persons which would account for the activation of the magnetometer. In denying the mo-
tion to suppress the evidence, the district court stated that "[tjhe present record is wholly
devoid of any evidence that could support an inference that either defendant was sub-
jected to a procedure that was not strictly related to safety in flight considerations and
rationally related to their assurance." Id. at 13.
125. 464 F.2d at 668 n.1
126. Bell had two previous convictions, "and at the time of his arrest [by the marshal],
stated that he was out on bail from the Tombs for attempted murder and narcotics
charges." Id. at 672.
127. Id. at 669.
128. 335 F. Supp. 797 (E.D.N.Y. 1971).
129. 464 F.2d 667 (2d Cir. 1972).
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Persuaded by Judge Weinstein's opinion in Lopez,"' the district court
found the anti-hijacking system constitutional."8' The profile selection
was held to have been applied without any ethnic or political prejudice
and without any additions or subtractions. 32
On the issue of the search, the district court expressed some reserva-
tion had the marshal's search been based only on the magnetometer since
that device was activated by approximately 50 percent of all passengers."'8
However, the court concluded that "the magnetometer must be viewed
within the context of the anti-hijacking system,' 34 and "is only one of
a series of screening procedures; a procedure that serves as much as a
deterrent to air piracy as it does a detector."' 80
The Second Circuit affirmed the findings of the district court.' Writ-
ing for a unanimous court, Judge Mulligan characterized as "baseless"
Bell's contention that the use of the magnetometer constituted an un-
reasonable search, since "[n]one of the personal indignities of the frisk
discussed by Chief Justice Warren in Terry [were] present."'3 7 Further-
more, in view of the magnitude of the crime sought to be prevented and
the exigencies of time which clearly precluded the obtaining of a warrant,
the use of the magnetometer was considered to be a reasonable pre-
caution. 138
In contrast to the above decisions, other cases arising in the context
of the anti-hijacking system have not reached the question of the system's
constitutionality.
Illustrative of such decisions is United States v. Lindsey,0 0 decided by
130. 328 F. Supp. 1077 (E.D.N.Y. 1971).
131. 335 F. Supp. at 799.
132. Id. at 800-01.
133. Id. at 802.
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. 464 F.2d 667 (2d Cir. 1972).
137. Id. at 673 (citation omitted). Judge Joseph A. Gillis, a Detroit magistrate, was
selected for a search by the FAA profile as he attempted to board a Delta Airlines flight on
December 21, 1971. Judge Gillis was "permitted to board after further checking showed
no indication of a weapon or any criminal intent." However, the judge was so upset over
the incident that he complained to the Civil Aeronautics Board and demanded a copy of
the tariff giving the airlines authority to conduct the search. The incident came to light
because Judge Gillis released two persons accused of assault and attempted rpe shortly
before the pair hijacked a plane at Houston, Texas, by shooting the ticket agent at the gate.
N.Y. Post, Nov. 13, 1972, at 4, col. 4.
138. 464 F.2d at 673.
139. 451 F.2d 701 (3d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 995 (1972); cf. People v.
Erdman, 69 Misc. 2d 103, 329 N.Y.S.2d 654 (Sup. Ct. 1972), wherein defendant passed
through a magnetometer, as required of all passengers, without incident while boarding an
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the Third Circuit Court of Appeals. A marshal from the Anti-Hijacking
Task Force was "monitoring" a flight from Newark Airport, when the
defendant rushed to the ticket agent and presented a ticket which was
in a name other than that by which he identified himself to the agent.
Because of this conduct, the airline agent signaled to the marshal to
watch the defendant. Observing that the defendant was nervous and
anxious, the marshal approached Lindsey and asked for identification
whereupon the defendant produced a draft card and a social security
card bearing different names. Noticing that the defendant had two large
bulges in his coat and fearing they might be weapons, the marshal "pat-
ted down" defendant's outer clothing and found two bags of heroin.140
The court affirmed the denial of the defendant's motion to suppress
the evidence on the ground that the extremely anxious behavior of the
defendant, and especially the use of four different names, provided a
sufficient basis for the marshal's action "in the context of an airline
boarding" and satisfied the Terry requirement .14 1 Although there was
some evidence that a behavior pattern profile was used, and the court
noted that there were "substantial issues" posed by the use of such a
device, it found no need to reach those issues because "the justifiable
bases for the search were largely indepenent of the Profile." 42
VI. Th CONSTITUTIONALITY AND EFFICACY OF THE PRESENT ANTI-
IJACKING SYSTEM
A. Constitutionality
The cases, discussed above, have upheld the anti-hijacking system
only by increasingly broad interpretations of the Terry doctrine. In
each case, the court faced the problem whether the airport marshal, at
the time he stopped to frisk the embarking passenger, had knowledge
of "specific and articulable facts" warranting the particular search, as re-
quired by Terry,4 or whether the frisk was based on nothing more than
aircraft. Customs officials, however, noticed a bulge in his pocket and patted him dom.
They inquired about the bulge and when informed it was a pair of "gloves," they asked
for them. Erdman surrendered the gloves which when unrolled revealed marijuana. The
court noted there was no justification for the search except the bulge and found that to be
insufficient. Consequently, since the prosecution could not prove that defendant consented
to the search from his conduct or his presence at the boarding gate, the court held that the
evidence was inadmissible. Id. at 104-06, 329 N.Y..2d at 655-58.
140. 451 F.2d at 702-03.
141. Id. at 704.
142. Id.
143. 392 U.S. at 21.
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a series of "inarticulate hunches.' ' 44 Statistics indicate that fourteen out
of every fifteen persons of those searched under the present anti-hijack-
ing system were found not to be carrying weapons.145 It would, therefore,
seem not unreasonable to characterize the circumstances, relied upon
to justify these searches, as hunches.
The Lopez court sustained the constitutionality of the anti-hijacking
system by relying heavily on the profile to provide some factual basis
on which to hinge the magnetometer search and the subsequent stop-and-
frisk. But as already noted, the profile is simply a compilation of innocu-
ous characteristics which, when taken together, do not purport to identify
potential hijackers. Rather than being a psychological measurement, the
profile is merely a means of classifying a persori "as somebody who
should be looked at further."'14
Mere statistical information that a person demonstrates certain normal
and innocuous characteristics, which may have been coincidentally ex-
hibited by a large number of prior skyjackers, can scarcely be considered
sufficiently suspicious to justify an intrusion into the right of privacy. 147
Otherwise, it is only a short step to suggest that a profile or composite
description of the typical mugger or narcotics addict be prepared for
distribution to the police for use in high crime areas. To suggest further
that the police then stop and search anyone matching the profile, and
who also appears nervous, etc., would be to invite immediate criticism.
Later cases like Epperson and Slocum appear to have abandoned the
need for a factual basis insofar as the magnetometer search is concerned.
These cases justify the magnetometer search as "reasonable" in view of
the exigent circumstances and the minor inconvenience to travelers, and
further sustain the reasonableness of the subsequent stop-and-frisk on
the basis of the magnetometer. Yet, as previously indicated, the mag-
netometer not only fails to detect non-ferrous weapons such as explosives,
acids, plastic, glass or non-ferrous knives, but is activated by approxi-
mately 50 percent of all embarking passengers, with such innocuous items
as coins, shoe plates, watches and keys.148
Thus, the results of a magnetometer search can provide no more than
a hunch as a basis for a subsequent frisk. By omitting the6 need for spe-
cific articulable facts, the three-factor rule in Terry has been truncated
144. Id. at 22.
145. United States v. Lopez, 328 F. Supp. 1077, 1084 (E.D.N.Y. 1971).
146. Arey 241.
147. Cf. Tribe, Trial by Mathematics: Precision and Ritual in the Legal Process, 84
Harv. L. Rev. 1329 (1971).
148. United States v. Bell, 335 F. Supp. 797, 802 (E.D.N.Y. 1971)
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to a two-factor rule whereby anyone may be stopped-and-frisked, pro-
vided the governmental interest is substantial and the personal intrusion
slight, and regardless of whether there exist any "specific and articulable"
facts.
Moreover, there are recent indications of a still further expansion of
Terry by omitting consideration of the extent of invasion the search
entails. The concurring opinion of Chief Judge Friendly in Bell would
deem the danger of airline hijacking sufficient, in and of itself, to justify
an airport search under present screening procedures, or indeed under
"wider or less precise measures when and if these should prove to be
needed."'14 9 Furthermore, Judge Friendly would have "no difficulty in
sustaining a search that was based on nothing more than the trained
intuition of an airline ticket agent or a marshal of the Anti-Hijacking
Task Force .... ,150
Judge Friendly's concurrence so alarmed Judge Mansfield, that the
latter in his concurring opinion quoted an earlier admonition that "'[i]f
the provisions of the Constitution be not upheld when they pinch as well
as when they comfort, they may as well be abandoned.' " Judge Mans-
field agreed that air hijacking was a serious threat to the safety of the
public, but did not agree that this justified "a broad and intensive search
of all passengers, measured only by the good faith of those conducting
the search, regardless of the absence of grounds for suspecting that the
passengers searched are potential hijackers." 2
Judge Mansfield analogized the danger of air hijackings to the sharp
increase in the rate of serious crimes in major cities, and suggested that
if the former constituted adequate grounds for a broad expansion of
police power, searches of persons or homes in high crime areas based
solely upon the "trained intuition" of the police could also be justified.
"With the door thus opened," said Judge Mansfield, "a serious abuse of
individual rights would almost inevitably follow. '"1 3
It is interesting to compare Judge Friendly's comments in Bell,'" an
airport search case, with those in Adams v. Williams,""5 a street search
situation. In Adams, Judge Friendly dissented, in pertinent part:
149. 464 F.2d at 675.
150. Id.
151. Id. at 676, citing Home Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 483 (1934)
(Sutherland, J., dissenting).
152. 464 F.2d at 675.
153. Id. at 676.
154. See text accompanying notes 149-50 supra.
155. 436 F.2d 30 (2d Cir. 1970), rev'd per curiam, 441 F.2d 394 (2d Cir. 1971), rev'd,
407 U.S. 143 (1972). In this case, a police officer received an unverified tip from an in-
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To begin, I have the greatest hesitancy in extending Terry to crimes like the posses-
sion of narcotics .. . There is too much danger that, instead of the stop being the
object and the protective frisk an incident thereto, the reverse will be true.
... If [Terry] is to be extended to [possessory offenses] at all, this should be only
where observation by the officer himself or well authenticated information shows "that
criminal activity may be afoot." . . . I greatly fear that if the decision here should
be followed, Terry will have opened the sluicegates for serious and unintended erosion
of the protection of the Fourth Amendment. 156
The Terry doctrine stands as the significant exception to the probable
cause requirement of the fourth amendment. Thus, it might have been
expected that the courts would have interpreted, as strictly as possible,
the factual requirements for the standard of reasonable suspicion. Instead,
the particular conditions currently prevailing at airports have resulted in
a removal of Terry from its factual setting. For, if the reasonableness of
a search is to be measured solely by the urgency of the government's
interest, without requiring facts to warrant the intrusion, the concepts of
reasonable suspicion and probable cause become dependent upon and
defined by each new public crisis to the point where the protections
afforded by the fourth amendment no longer exist.
We do not believe that Terry can constitutionally be expanded to cover
the airport anti-hijacking situation, and attempts to do so can only lead to
a potentially serious dilution of the protections embodied in the fourth
amendment. As stated in Camara v. Municipal Court,1 7 "public interest
would hardly justify a sweeping search of an entire city . . . ,,11s Neither
should public interest justify a sweeping search of all air passengers.
The present airport screening procedures present other difficulties
which arise within the context of the trial. An immediate constitutional
question is raised by the alleged compelling national urgency to protect
the confidentiality of the behavior profile. The reason for this secrecy is
that "it would not only be possible but relatively simple for a prospective
hijacker to avoid the initial designation were any of the norms employed
to become generally known."'
1 9
formant that a man in a specific automobile at a particular location was carrying both a
gun in his waistband and a quantity of narcotics. The police officer approached the auto-
mobile, immediately reached in through the open window, and seized the gun from the
defendant's waistband. He thereupon arrested the defendant and commenced a search for
narcotics which were found in the defendant's wallet and pocket
156. 436 F.2d at 38-39.
157. 387 U.S. 523 (1967).
158. Id. at 535.
159. United States v. Bell, 464 F.2d 667, 670 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 41 U.S.L.W. 3254
(U.S. Nov. 6, 1972)
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As a result, the presentation of profile evidence in the prosecution's
case is presented before the presiding judge, without the presence of the
public and the defendant, and limited to counsel. This procedure will con-
tinue to raise the allegations, as it did in Bell, Slocum, and Lopez, that
the defendant is being denied the right to a public trial,' to the con-
frontation of witnesses,161 and to the effective assistance of counsel.10 2
Exclusion of the public has previously been found constitutionally
permissible where it was deemed necessary to protect the defendant,"
where there has been harassment of witnesses,"" and to preserve order in
the courtroom. 6 5 The exclusion of the public, for the profile portion of
the trial, in order to protect the air-traveling public, is probably a sub-
stantial enough consideration to qualify as another exception to the public
trial requirement, and the airport search cases considering this issue have
so held. 66
A more complex question is presented in defendant's claim of a sixth
amendment violation because he is not confronted with the witnesses
against him during the presentation of the profile testimony. 67 Neverthe-
less, the courts that have examined this contention have stressed that the
witness testifying outside defendant's presence did so in the presence of
the trial judge, who could observe his demeanor and determine his
credibility.'68 In addition, counsel for defendant has the opportunity to
cross-examine." 9 Therefore, it can be expected that courts will continue
to hold that such testimony is "not the extrajudicial statement of the un-
available witness which normally provokes the invocation of the con-
frontation guarantee."1 70
Furthermore, courts have stressed that this exclusion of the witness
occurs at a suppression hearing and not at trial, and that suppression
hearings are concerned with the legality of the seizures of contraband and
160. See In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257 (1948).
161. See Salinger v. United States, 272 US. 542 (1926).
162. See Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
163. Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333 (1966); Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532 (1965).
164. United States ex rel. Bruno v. Herold, 408 F.2d 125 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied,
397 US. 957 (1970).
165. United States ex rel. Orlando v. Fay, 350 F.2d 967 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied,
384 U.S. 1008 (1966).
166. See, e.g., United States v. Bell, 464 F.2d 667 (2d Cir. 1972); United States v. Lopez,
328 F. Supp. 1077 (E.D.N.Y. 1971).
167. United States v. Bell, 464 F.2d 667, 670 (2d Cir. 1972).
168. Id. at 671.
169. Id. at 672; United States v. Lopez, 328 F. Supp. 1077, 1088 (EMD.N.Y. 1971).
170. 464 F.2d at 671.
1972]
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not with the question of defendant's guilt or innocence.1 71 In Bell, the
minutes of the suppression hearing became the trial record. The court
noted that this was done by stipulation of counsel.1 72 Still, it remains to
be seen how a case involving profile testimony given at trial would be
decided.
The courts in airport seizure cases have not yet decided the issue that
the in camera hearing does nothing to preserve the defendant's confidence
in the fairness of the judicial system. Regardless of prejudice to a defen-
dant's case, his presence is essential simply to assure him that the process
which convicted him was fundamentally fair.1 7 3
Another constitutional problem presented by airline screening pro-
cedures is the necessity of giving warnings, as required by Miranda v.
Arizona,7 4 if a prospective defendant is being subjected to "custodial
interrogation" by the United States marshal or by the airline representa-
tives acting as government agents. In Bell, Judge Mulligan, although find-
ing that the Miranda issue was not properly raised on the appeal, never-
theless indicated that "[a] t this stage there was no obligation to give such
warnings." 75
However, it may be anticipated that in other cases of a similar nature,
the Miranda issue will be raised. This is especially true since it has been
held that airline employees acted as government agents "insofar as they
designated 'selectees' and alerted Marshals."' 76 Since marshals and airline
personnel are not advising passengers, who may have activated mag-
netometers or matched profiles, that they may choose not to fly, it may
be that "custodial interrogation"'1 7 aptly describes the situation of a
prospective airline traveler stopped by the marshal at the boarding ramp
and involuntarily searched.
B. Efficacy
In addition to doubts about the constitutionality of the anti-hijacking
system, we also have serious reservations about its effectiveness. The sys-
tem was designed primarily to deter potential skyjackers by erecting a
series of obstacles which an air passenger would have to traverse before
boarding the airplane. This system was based on the assumption that the
171. Id. at 671-72.
172. Id. at 671.
173. See Lewis v. United States, 146 U.S. 370, 372 (1892).
174. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
175. 464 F.2d at 674.
176. 328 F. Supp. at 1101.
177. Custodial interrogation was defined in Miranda as questioning after a defendant
has been "deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way." 384 U.S. at 445.
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psychology of a typical potential skyjacker is that of a 'loser" or "failure"
who would be easily dissuaded by a series of impediments. Thus, the very
existence of such a system should theoretically be able to deter potential
skyjackers.
Yet, the system and particularly the profile, as it operates to detect
skyjackers, is based on the mere behavior of the typical skyjacker as he
presents himself for boarding, rather than upon more intricate psycho-
logical manifestations. It is doubtful whether the behavior of embarking
passengers, particularly if economic considerations are involved, provides
sufficient insight into criminal propensities to supply a dependable basis
for searching them.
There are other difficulties. Under the present system, the behavioral
profile is applied at check-in counters by airline personnel who, at the
same time, are checking tickets, weighing luggage, and answering requests
for information. These airline employees, while focusing on certain sim-
ple, obvious characteristics provided by the profile, may well be diverted
from noticing other significant manifestations. Their application of the
profile is likely to be mechanical and perfunctory, and accordingly, their
assessment of the embarking passenger may bear little relationship to
his skyjacking potential.
While the present system may have had some effect in deterring the
"failure" or "loser" personality from attempting a hijacking, there has
been little statistical indication that the system has been able to success-
fully detect potential hijackers who actually attempt to board the air-
plane.178 After all, approximately 94 percent of those frisked were found
not to be carrying concealed weapons, 179 and of those arrested for crimes
as a result of the anti-hijacking system only 17 percent were charged
with carrying concealed weapons. 8 '
Moreover, the number of skyjackings since 1970 has remained fairly
constant, despite the ready acceptance and rapid expansion of the anti-
hijacking system throughout the country. It has become a familiar situa-
tion, following each new air hijacking, for the FAA to allege that the
hijacker met the profile but that it was not properly applied, while the
airline claims the reverse. We think the present anti-hijacking system is
neither good law nor good law enforcement, and that an alternative sys-
tem must be developed.
178. Dr. Hubbard, on the other hand, claims the system may only increase skyjacking
by challenging the skyjacker-prone personality. Perilous War on the Skyjacker, Life, Aug.
11, 1972, at 26, 27, 29




VII. A REASONABLE APPROACH
Efforts have been made to justify the reasonableness of airport searches
on the basis of the Terry doctrine. 181 But Terry, anchored to the ability
of the experienced police officer to recognize suspicious conduct, was not
meant to be extended to the inarticulate hunches supplied by the behav-
ioral profile and magnetometer as interpreted by airline personnel un-
schooled in the nuances of law enforcement. Nevertheless, if the present
screening system is to be discarded, an alternative strategy must be
devised to protect air commerce from the unacceptable risk of skyjacking.
A. Federal Airport Security Force
The airline industry claims that policing the airports is a responsibility
of the federal government. 1 2 On the other hand, the federal government
alleges that it is the responsibility of the airlines to provide the necessary
funding for law enforcement at the airport.'3 The present anti-hijacking
system has consequently evolved from these fiscal difficulties and jurisdic-
tional disputes. While this system may emphasize relatively low cost and
administrative facility, it is questionable whether prime consideration is
being accorded the safety of the air traveler.
Law enforcement is not the business of the airlines, whose employees
may have had little or no training in crime detection or in airport security
methods. We think it is appropriate to return the responsibility for detect-
ing such criminal activity as armed potential skyjackers to experienced
law enforcement officials funded by the federal government. Such law
enforcement officials should perform their duties within the traditional
constitutional limitations imposed on searches by the fourth amendment
and on frisks by Terry.
If the responsibility for airport law enforcement were entrusted to a
federal airport security force, the profile would be merely an addition
to the investigatory techniques utilized by a law enforcement officer able
to devote full time to the job of stopping air hijackers. Upon observing
suspicious behavior on the part of a passenger, the law enforcement
official could, within the limits set forth in Terry, stop, question and ulti-
mately frisk a suspect without raising the numerous constitutional prob-
lems which beset the present system.
181. United States v. Bell, 464 F.2d 667, 673-74 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 41 U.S.L.W.
3254 (U.S. Nov. 6, 1972); United States v. Epperson, 454 F.2d 769, 770-72 (4th Cir.),
cert. denied, 406 U.S. 947 (1972); United States v. Lopez, 328 F. Supp. 1077, 1092-98
(E.D.N.Y. 1971)
182. See 118 Cong. Rec. 15,622 (daily ed. Sept. 21, 1972).
183. See Id.
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The airport security force would, in addition to providing a more
realistic opportunity to detect potential skyjackers, offer other advan-
tages: a) federal airport officials would constitute a highly visible show
of authority thereby providing a psychological deterrent to the potential
skyjacker; b) in the event a potential skyjacker attempted to board an
aircraft by force, a federal airport official would be promptly available
to protect life and property; c) an organized and effective federal force
would be privy to information available to and through law enforcement
agencies concerning extremist groups or known criminals who might
attempt a skyjacking.
A skyjacking which occurred on October 29, 1972 in Houston, Texas
dramatically highlighted the need for the proposed system of prevention.
Four skyjackers armed with pistols and a shotgun killed an Eastern Air-
lines gate agent and wounded another employee at Houston Intercon-
tinental Airport before diverting a jet and its 29 passengers to Cuba'"
An Eastern Airlines spokesman indicated that all of the passengers had
passed through a "hijack deterrent system.""'
Subsequently, it appeared that the FAA had issued an alert to all air-
lines, two days before this incident, that there might be a skyjack-
ing attempt by at least two fugitives who were being sought in con-
nection with a murder and attempted bank robbery in Virginia. Eastern
Airlines claimed it had received no such warning.168 However, an airline
trade association claimed that the government warning had gone out to
all members two days before the skyjacking.18 It was noted that "[t]he
general view of aviation experts was that the skyjacking might have been
prevented only if an armed and uniformed Federal marshal or other
police official had been on duty at the gate. He might have served as a
psychological deterrent."' 88
B. Other Proposals
While the authors believe that a federal security force is the only viable
solution to the threat of skyjackers, there are other proposals which merit
attention.
1. Express Consent
Since fourth amendment constitutional rights may be waived by con-
.tract or by consent, as long as that consent is unequivocal and unam-
184. N.Y. Times, OcL 30, 1972, at 1, col. 2.
185. Id. at 9, col 1.
186. N.Y. Times, Oct. 31, 1972, at 1, coL 2.
187. Id.
188. Id. at 9, coL 1.
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biguous, and not in any way the result of fraud, duress or coercion, 189 it
has been suggested that a passenger's right to air travel could be condi-
tioned on his consenting to being searched prior to embarkationY'0° A
passenger could be given a Miranda type warning that he need not submit
to a pre-flight search but, that without such, he would not be allowed to
board the aircraft. At this point, a passenger, not wishing to expose him-
self to a search, could decline to board. If the passenger elected to pro-
ceed, he would be deemed to have consented to a search. This strategy
would protect air commerce, obviate the need for a secret profile, and
eliminate in camera hearings.
However, this general consent approach raises the question whether
the constitutional right to travel may be predicated on the relinquishment
of fourth amendment rights.' Although, generally, the government may
place qualifications on the grant of a privilege, it may not when the prece-
dent qualification is the relinquishment of a constitutional right. If such
principles control the government in the grant of a privilege, they would
appear more binding when applied to a recognized constitutional right
such as the right to travel."0 2 It is hardly persuasive to suggest that there
are alternative modes of travel since, in many situations, flying may be the
only practical means of transportation.
2. Placing Airport Searches in a Sui Generis Position Analogous to
Border Searches
Border searches have been held to qualify as express exceptions to the
reasonableness requirement of the fourth amendment: "'unsupported or
mere' suspicion alone is sufficient to justfy [a border] search for pur-
poses of Customs law enforcement."' 93 Thus, in conferring upon customs
officers such broad authority, the Congress has in effect declared reason-
able a search conducted by customs officials in lawful pursuit of unlawful
imports.' The validity of the distinction between customs searches and
those conducted by police officers in the ordinary case, is based on the
fact that the purpose of a customs search is not to apprehend persons,
189. Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 U.S. 543, 548 (1968).
190. Cf. Airport Security Searches and the Fourth Amendment, 71 Colum. L. Rev. 1039,
1047 (1971); 328 F. Supp. at 1093.
191. See United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745, 759 (1966).
192. Airport Security Searches and the Fourth Amendment, 71 Colum. L. Rev. 1039, 1049
(1971).
193. Alexander v. United States, 362 F.2d 379, 382 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S.
977 (1966).
194. People v. Furey, 42 Misc. 2d 579, 580-81, 248 N.Y.S.2d 460, 462-63 (Sup. Ct. 1964).
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but to seize contraband property unlawfully brought into the United
States. 95
Airport searches are arguably analogous to border searches in that the
objective in each case is the discovery of contraband rather than the
detection of past crime. 96 However, it must be recognized that, histori-
cally, border searches have applied only to persons entering the country,
not to those travelling within or leaving it.'97 To place airport searches in
a special category would certainly be a more direct and effective approach
to the problem than an ineffective and unconstitutional expansion of the
Terry rationale. Nevertheless, we regard such approach as premature
since there has been no attempt made to utilize conventional law enforce-
ment methods in this area.
3. Frisk Limited to Weapons
The argument has been advanced that if the right to frisk is based on a
reasonable fear that the suspect is armed, then if a frisk discloses a
weapon, the weapon alone should be seized and the suspect prosecuted.
For example, in his dissent in People v. Sibron Judge Van Vooris of the
New York Court of Appeals stated:
If we go beyond that, then frisking a suspect, which can be done in practice (though
not in theory) at the officer's whim, will become a pretext for the general search of
the person, without probable cause, which the Fourteenth Amendment was designed to
prevent. The power to frisk is an exception to the probable cause rule in search and
seizure, and is not a search at all except for the discovery of a dangerous weapon
concealed upon the person. There it should end, for all purposes.198
However, this theory would artificially encumber the rule that if a
search is valid at its inception, and if properly circumscribed, an officer
need not ignore evidence of other crimes which he uncovers during the
195. See Alexander v. United States, 362 F.2d at 381-82.
196. Airport Security Searches and the Fourth Amendment, 71 Colum. L. Rev. 1039,
1050-51 (1971).
197. Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886).
198. People v. Sibron, 18 N.Y.2d 603, 606, 219 N.E2d 196, 198, 272 N.Y.S.2d 374, 377
(1966) (Van Voorhis, J., dissenting), rev'd, 392 U.S. 40 (1968).
It has further been contended that since Terry defines the frisk as a limited exception
to the probable cause requirement of the fourth amendment, "[a] ruling that only a
hidden weapon may be introduced into evidence might at least eliminate any incentive for
police to use the 'self-protective' frisk as a vehicle for evidentary searches in the alsence of
probable cause .... [T]o exclude all contraband but weapons discovered during a frisk
should in no way frustrate legitimate police activity which is justified in this context only
as a means of protecting the officer." The Supreme Court, 1967 Term, 82 Harv. L. Rev. 63,
186 (1968) (footnotes omitted).
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course of the search. 99 In addition, it would create still another exclu-
sionary category to admissible evidence and might result in the inability
to prosecute those who fortuitously possessed evidence of other crimes
while submitting to an airport search. An approach with such far-reaching
effects on law enforcement should be adopted only after its implications
have been thoroughly weighed.
VIII. CONCLUSION
Air hijacking will cease to be a problem when the nations of the world
agree to refuse sanctuary and to return the skyjacker to the prosecuting
authorities in his own country. Of the 239 hijackings which occurred
world-wide between January 1, 1968 and July 24, 1971, at least 151, or
63 percent, were intended for Cuba; 126 were successful. Of the 106
American planes on which skyjackings have been attempted during this
period, 79 attempts, or 75 percent, were intended for Cuba."0
Although Cuba is the principal haven for successful air hijackers,201
there are indications that Fidel Castro is not especially pleased with
this distinction and is ready to enter into agreements with the United
States which are in keeping with the 1970 Hague Convention. 02 If these
proposed agreements should become a reality, a major step would be
taken in reducing the threat of skyjackings to United States airlines.
However until the day when international cooperation completely
forecloses asylum to the skyjacker, it is submitted that only an effective
federal airport police force can constitutionally contain the threat of
skyjacking. -0 3
199. Abel v. United States, 362 U.S. 217 (1960); Harris v. United States, 331 U.S. 145
(1947), overruled on other grounds, Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969).
200. Arey 320-54. See text accompanying notes 53-59 supra.
201. A second major hijacking trouble area, is comprised of the Arab countries of the
Middle East and North Africa. Few of these countries have entered into the Hague Con-
vention and, under present circumstances, it seems unlikely that even a few of these Arab
countries could be induced to enter the Convention.
202. On November 15, 1972, the governments of the United States and Cuba announced
that they would begin negotiations, conducted through the Swiss Government, to curb air-
lines hijacking. N.Y. Times, Nov. 16, 1972, at 1, col. 8; N.Y. Times, Nov. 21, 1972, at 1,
col. 6.
203. After this article was written, the federal government announced that, by January
5, 1973, every piece of luggage carried aboard U.S. airliners would be searched and every
passenger screened for weapons by electronic metal detectors. By February 5, 1973, the
government plans to station armed local law-enforcement officers at all boarding areas In
each of the country's commercial airports. N.Y. Times, Dec. 6, 1972, at 93, col. 1. A recent
federal district court decision focused upon certain of the problems discussed in this article.
In United States v. Meulener, Crim. No. 10931 (C.D. Cal., filed Dec. 4, 1972) a California
district court held that no passenger, or his carry-on luggage may be searched without ex-
press, voluntary consent.
